A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation /

Incluye referencias bibliográficas e índice

Introduction. The Regulatory Environment and Institutions. Regulatory Constraints. Regulatory Instruments and Incentive Schemes. Simple versus Informationally Demanding Regulatory Rule. Procurement versus Regulation. Commonly Used Incentive Schemes. Procurement Contracts. Regulatory Incentive Schemes in the Absence of Government Transfers. Received Theory and the Agenda for the New Regulatory Economics. Marginal Cost Pricing. Peak-Load Pricing. Marginal or Average Cost Pricing?. Balanced Budget and the Ramsey-Boiteux Model of Cost-of-Service Regulation. Input Choices. The Agenda of the New Regulatory Economics. Methodology and Overview of the Book. The Controlled Experiment. Overview of the Book. References.

Price and rate-of-return regulation. Cost-reimbursement rules. Sorne Background. Tbe Model. Tbe Two-Type Case. Continuum of Types. The Main Economic Conclusions. Implementation: Relevance and Informational Requirements of Menus. Using Yardstick "Competition" to Reduce Informational Asymmetries. Adding lnvestment to the Model. lnvestment under Noncommitment. Multiperiod Relationship under Commitment: False Dynamics. Risk Aversion. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References.

Pricing by a single-product firm with and without Budget balance. Sorne Background. The Model. The Two-Type Case. Continuum of Types. Delegation of Pricing to the Firm. Two-Part Tariffs in the Absence of Government Transfer. Linear Pricing in the Absence of Government Transfer. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. References.

Pricing and incentives in multiproduct firm. Sorne Background. Optimal Regulation. Third-Degree Price Discrimination. Second-Degree Price Discrimination. Veriliable Quality. The Incentive-Pricing Dichotomy. Multidimensional Effort and Characteristics. Is Subcost Observation Useful?. General Equilibrium Analysis: Foundations of the Shadow Cost of Public Funds and Taxation by
Regulation. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References. Contents.

Regulation of quality. Sorne Background. The Model with a Search Good. Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information. Implementation of the Optima) Regulatory Mechanism. Concern for Quality and the Power of Incentive Schemes. Reputation Incentives for an Experience Good. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References.


Product market competition. Competitive Ramsey formulas and Access pricing. Sorne Background. Pricing and Competition. Access Pricing: Pricing in the Absence of Incentive Correction. Access Pricing and Incentives. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References.

Bypass and cream skimming. Sorne Background. The Model. Optimal Pricing Rules and Optimal Incentive Schemes. Bypass and Cream Skimming. Sorne Further Considerations about Bypass: Redistribution and Budget Constraint.. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References.

Bidding for natural monopoly. Auctioning incentive contracts. Sorne Background. The Model.
The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Two-Firm, Two-Type Case. The Optimal Bayesian Auction in the Continuum Case. Implementation by a Dominant Strategy Auction. Optimality of Linear Contracts. Auctions in Regulation. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References.

Repeated auctions of incentives contracts, investment, and bidding parity. Sorne Background. The Model. Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information. Learning by Doing. Assessment of the Model. Transferable lnvestment. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References. Contents.

The dynamics of regulations. Dynamics without commitment and the Ratchet effect. Some Background. The Model. Ratcheting and Pooling in the Continuum Case. The Two-Type Case. Characterization of Finite First-Period Menus That Induce the Upper Bound on Welfare. Concluding Rernarks. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References.

Commitment and renegotiation. Some Background. The Model. Renegotiation-Proof Second-Period Contracts. Characterization of the Optimal Contract. How Much Pooling?. Continuum of Types. Cornmitment, Renegotiation, and Noncornmitment. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References.

The politics of regulation. Regulatory capture. Sorne Background. The Model. Collusion-Free Regulation. Producer Protection. Multiple Interest Groups. Shutdown of the Regulated Firm. A Political Theory of Cross-subsidization. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References.

Cost padding, auditing, and collusion. Some Background. The Benchmark (No Cost Padding, No Auditing). Audit of Cost Padding. Monitoring of Effort. Bibliographic Notes. Appendix. References.

Cartelization by regulation. Some Background. The Model. Benevolent Agency and Incomplete Information about the lncumbent's Technology. Cartelization. Pro- and Anticompetition Agencies. Appendixes. References. Contents.

Auction design and favoritism. Some Background. The Model. Optimal Auction with a Benevolent Agency. Collusion and Soft Information. Asymmetric Collusion and Hard Information. Symmetric Collusion and Hard Information. Concluding Remarks. Appendixes. References.

Regulatory institutions. Regulatory instruments, hearing, and interest group monitoring. Welfare Foundations of Institutions. The Model. The Solution. Choice of Watchdog. Concluding. Remarks. Appendixes. References.

Commmitment and political account ability. Some Background. Short-lived Regulators and the Optimal Constitution. The Model. Contents. Short-lived Regulators and Complete Contracting. Elections, Career Concerns, and Commitment. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. References.

Privatizacion and incentives. Some Background. The Model. Optimal Regulation with Public Ownership. Optimal Regulation of a Prívate Firm. Comparison of Ownership Structures. Concluding Remarks. Bibliographic Notes. Appendixes. References.

Conclusion. Review exercises.